Menarik untuk disimak pesan Rasululah saw yang mengatakan “ Istafti Qalbak, mintalah fatwa pada hatimu “

Kebaikan adalah sesuatu yang membuat hatimu tenang dan keburukan adalah sesuatu yang membuat hatimu gelisah “ jadi disini hati menjadi tempat bertanya bagi kita kala harus memutuskan sesuatu yang penting. Hati sebagai sumber cahaya batiniah, inspirasi, kreativitas dan belas kasih.

Dalam hadis lain disebutkan bahwa kualitas seseorang ditentukan hati pula “ Hati bagaikan raja, dan hati memiliki bala tentara, bila raja itu baik, maka baiklah seluruh bala tentaranya. Dan kalau hati itu rusak, maka rusaklah seluruh bala tentaranya. ( Kanzul Ummal, hadis ke 1205)

Menurut al-Tirmidzi, hati memilik empat stasiun: dada (shard),hati(qalb), hati lebih dalam (fu’ad) dan inti-hati-terdalam (lubb). Keempat stasiun ini saling bersusunan bagaikan sekumpulan lingkaran. Dada adalah lingkaran terluarnya, hati dan hati-lebih dalam berada pada kedua lingkaran tengah,sedangkan inti hati terletak di pusat lingkaran.

Adapun diskripsi dari masing-masing stasiun secara umum diterangkan sebagai berikut :

Dada(Shadr)

Cahaya islam, muslim, pengetahuan tentang tindakan yang benar,Nafs Ammarah Tirani atau memerintahkan kepada keburukan.

Hati(Qalb)

Cahaya iman, mukmin, pengetahuan batiniah, Nafs Lawwamah penuh penyesalan.

Hati-lebih-dalam (Fu’ad)

Cahaya makrifat, Arif (ahli makrifat), penglihatan batiniah, Nafs Mulhamah terilhami

Inti-hati-terdalam (lubb)

Cahaya tauhid, Muahhid (ahli tauhid), sikap illahiah, Nafs Muthma’innah tenteram.

Ketika mata hati terbuka, kita dapat melihat kenyataan yang tersembunyi di balik penampakan luar dunia ini.

Ketika telinga hati terbuka, kita mampu mendengar kebenaran yang tersembunyi dibalik kata-kata yang terucap. Melalui hati yang terbuka, system saraf kita dapat menyesuaikan diri dengan system saraf orang lain, sehingga kita mengetahui apa yang mereka pikirkan dan bagaimana mereka akan bersikap

Untuk mengetahui empat stasiun hati ini, marilah kita liat seperti apa stasiun-stasiun hati ini dan dalil-dalil yang mendukungnya.

SHADR(DADA)

Dalil Al Quran yang mendukung keberadaan stasiun shadr ini antara lain :

QS.Ali Imran:154, yang berbunyi

“ Supaya Allah menguji apa yang ada didalam shard kalian ”

QS.al-Araf:2,

“ Maka, jangan sampai ada kesempitan didalam shard-mu karenanya.

QS.Hud:12,

“ Maka bisa jadi engkau meninggalkan sebagian dari yang diwahyukan kepadamu dan shadr-mu merasa sempit karenanya “

QS.al-Syarh:1,

“ Bukankah Kami telah melapangkan untukmu shadr-mu “

QS.an Nahl:106,

“ Akan tetapi siapa yang shadr merasa lapang dengan kekufuran, maka mereka layakmendapat murka Allah “

QS.al Anam:125,

“ Siapa yang hendak Allah beri petunjuk, Dia lapangkan shadr nya untuk menerima islam. Sementara siapa yang hendak dia sesakkan, dia jadikan shadr nya sempit dan berat.

Dalil-dalil lain yang mendukung shadr ini, ada dalam QS yang lain seperti :

QS.al Hujurat:14;QS.al Baqoroh:112; QS.al Maidah:44;QS.al Shaffat:103,QS.Yunus:84 dan masih banyak lagi dalil yang mendukung stasiun shadr ini.

QALB(HATI)

Adapun dalil-dalil yang mendukung stasiun qalb ini antara lain :

QS.al Hajj:46

“ Sesungguhnya bukan penglihatan ini yang buta, tetapi yang buta adalah hati yang terdapat di shadr “

QS.al Isra’:36

“ Sesungguhnya pendengaran, penglihatan,dan fu’ad semuanya akan ditanya “

QS.al Mujadilah:22

“ Mereka adalah orang-orang yang Allah tuliskan keimanan dalam hati mereka “

QS.al Hujurat:7

“ Akan tetapi Allah membuat kalian menyenangi keimanan dan menghiasinya di hati kalian “

Dan masih banyak dalil yang mendukung tentang keberadaan Qalb ini.

FU’AD (HATI LEBIH DALAM)

Pada stasiun ini, dalil-dalil yang menunjang antara lain sebagai berikut :

QS.al Najm:11

“ Fu’ad beliau tidak mendustakan apa yang telah dilihatnya “

QS.al Qashash :10

“ Hati ibu musa menjadi hampa.Hampir saja ia mengungkapkan rahasia tentang Musa “

Kata fu’ad adalah turunan dari kata fa’idah (manfaat).Jadi artinya melihat berbagai manfaat dari cintanya. Fuad meraih manfaat dari proses melihat, dan hatinya merasa nikmat dengan pengetahuan yang ada.

LUBB(INTI HATI)

Lubb adalah gunung yang paling agung dan lapisan yang paling selamat.Lubb menjadi factor utama tegaknya agama. Seluruh cahaya kembali kepadanya dan memagari sekitarnya. Beberapa dalil pendukung sebagai berikut:

QS.al Hujurat:7

“ Akan tetapi, Allah membuat kalian cinta kepada iman dan menghiasinya di hati kalian “

QS.al Nahl:67

“ Sesungguhnya pada yang demikian itu anda-tanda kekuasaan Allah bagi mereka yang berakal “

Dan Masih banyak lagi dalil-dalil pendukung tentang kedudukan dari stasiun Lubb ini.

With this opening invocation, I turn my attention to Tasawwuf – a realm of the Islamic sciences that is easily misunderstood without qualified instruction. Any discussion and/or comments on Tasawwuf must be backed by the knowledge of scholars in this field. Tasawwuf is one of the several Islamic sciences (ulum). The essence of Tasawwuf is purely Islamic. To make this point, I will, in sha Allah, limit myself to reproducing opinions of scholars and taking extracts from several authentic sources.

I begin with a description of Tasawwuf in a recently published comprehensive work on Islam, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, edited by Professor John L. Esposito, Oxford University Press, Oxford, May 1995, 4 vols.: “in a broad sense, Sufism can be described as the interiorization and intensification of Islamic faith and practice. The original sense of sufi seems to have been ‘one who wears wool.’ By the eighth century the word was sometimes applied to Muslims whose ascetic inclinations led them to wear coarse and uncomfortable woolen garments. Gradually it came to designate a group who differentiated themselves from others by emphasis on certain specific teachings and practices of the Quran and the sunnah. By the ninth century the gerund form tasawwuf, literally ‘being a sufi’ or ‘sufism,’ was adopted by representatives of this group as their appropriate designation.

Understood as Islam’s life-giving core, sufism is co-extensive with Islam. Wherever there have been Muslims, there have been sufis. If there was no phenomenon called ‘sufism’ at the time of the Prophet, neither was there anything called ‘fiqh’ or ‘kalam’ in the later senses of these terms. All these are names that came to be applied to various dimensions of Islam after the tradition became diversified and elaborated. In looking for a Quranic name for the phenomenon that later generations came to call sufism, some authors settled on the term ihsan, ‘doing what is beautiful,’ a divine and human quality about which the Quran says a good deal, mentioning in particular that God loves those who possess it. In the famous Hadith of Gabriel, the Prophet describes ihsan as the innermost dimension of Islam, after Islam (‘submission’ or correct activity) and iman (“faith” or correct understanding).” [vol. 4, pp. 102-104.]

The link between Ihsan and Tasawwuf is reiterated in the English translation of Sahih Muslim by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi in a footnote to the above hadith: “Ihsan means beneficence, performance of good deeds, but in the religious sense it implies the doing of good deeds over and above what is just and fair. It is indicative of the intense devotion of man to his Creator and Master and his enthusiasm for virtue and piety. What is implied by the term tasawwuf in Islam is nothing but Ihsan. The aim of Ihsan is to create a sense of inner piety in man and to train his sensibilities in a way that all his thoughts and actions flow from the fountainhead of the love of God.” [vol. 1, pp. 3-4.]

In his work, The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam, HarperCollins, New York, Cyril Glasse describes Tasawwuf as “the mysticism or esotericism of Islam.” He writes: “The word is commonly thought to come from the Arabic word suf (‘wool’): rough woolen clothing characterized the early ascetics, who preferred its symbolic simplicity to richer and more sophisticated materials. The essence of sufism is purely Islamic. Sufism is found everywhere in the Islamic world; it is the inner dimension of Islam, from which the efficacy and force of Islam as a religion flow.

Sufism may take many forms,

but it always contains two poles: doctrine and method. Doctrine can be summarized as intellectual discrimination between the Real and the unreal, the basis for this being found essentially in the shahadah: “there is no god but God” or “there is no reality but the Reality.” Methods can be summarized as the concentration upon the Real by the “remembrance of God” (dhikr Allah), the invocation of the Divine Name (dhikr means “remembrance”, “mention”, “invocation”). Both doctrine and method must, however, be complemented by perfect surrender to God and the maintenance of an equilibrium through the spiritual regime, which is Islam. The Qur’an often underlines the importance of invocation in words such as these: “Remember God standing and sitting. . .” (3:191); ” . . . Those who believe and do good works, and remember God much. . . ” (26:227); and “Surely the Remembrance of God is Greatest” (wa ladhikru-Llahi akbar) (29:45). The principle of reciprocity between God and man is expressed by God’s revealed words: “Therefore remember Me; I will remember you” (fadhkuruni adhkurum) (2:152).

All spiritual method also necessarily involves the practice of the virtues, summarized in the concept of ihsan, the surpassing of self, which a Sacred Hadith defines thus: “Worship God as if you saw Him, for if you do not see him, nevertheless, He sees you.” To this, the sufis add: “And if there were no you, you would see,’ and make the summation of mystical virtue the quality of “spiritual poverty” (faqr). By faqr they mean emptying the soul of the ego’s false “reality” in order to make way for what God wills for the soul.

In his Al-Maqasid, Imam Nawawi, the great Shafi’i scholar, discusses sufism at great length. His conclusions may be summarized as follows: “The basic rules of the way of sufism are five:

1. having godfearingness privately and publicly,
2. living according to the sunna in word and deed,
3. indifference to whether others accept or reject one,
4. satisfaction with Allah Most High in scarcity and plenty, and
5. turning to Allah in happiness or affliction.

The foundations of all of these consist of five things:

1. high aspiration,
2. keeping Allah’s reverence,
3. giving the best of service,
4. keeping one’s spiritual resolves, and
5. esteeming Allah’s blessings.

The principles of sufism’s signs on a person are also five:

1. seeking Sacred Knowledge in order to perform Allah’s command;

2. keeping the company of sheikhs and fellow disciples in order to see with insight;

3. forgoing both dispensations from religious obligations and figurative interpretations of scripture, for the sake of cautiousness;

4. organizing one’s time with spiritual works to maintain presence of heart; and

5. suspecting the self in all matters, in order to free oneself from caprice and be safe from destruction.

One reaches Allah Most High by:

§ repenting from all things unlawful or offensive;

§ seeking Sacred Knowledge in the amount needed;

§ continuously keeping on ritual purity;

§ performing the prescribed prayers [fard] at the first of their times in a group prayer (and praying the confirmed sunnas [sunna mu'akkada] associated with them);

§ always performing eight rak’as of the nonobligatory midmorning prayer (al-duha), the six rak’as between the sunset (maghrib) and nightfall (‘isha) prayers, the night vigil prayer (tahajjud) after having risen from sleeping, and the witr prayer;

§ fasting Mondays and Thursdays;

§ reciting the Qur’an with presence of heart and reflecting on its meanings;

§ asking much for Allah’s forgiveness (istaghfar);

§ always invoking the Blessings on the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace); and

§ persevering in the dhikrs that are sunna in the morning and evening.

These include, among others, the following verses of the Qur’an:

§ Al-Bakarah: 285-6,

§ At-Tauba: 129,

§ ar-Rum: 17-19,

§ Surah Ya-Sin,

§ Al-Hashr: 21-24,

§ Sura Al-Ikhlas,

§ Sura al-Falaq, and

§ Sura al-Nas.í [pp. 85-92]

The origin of sufism was also discussed by a great scholar of sufism, Ali Ibn Uthman al-Hujwiri, in his book Kashf al-Mahjub (English translation by Reynold A. Nicholson, Luzac and Company, London, 1976): “Some assert that the sufi is so called because he wears a woolen garment (jama’i suf); others that he is so called because he is in the first rank (saff-i awwal); others say it is because the sufis claim to belong to the Ashab-i Suffa, with whom may God be well-pleased! Others, again, declare that the name is derived from safa (purity).” [p. 30]. He then describes Ashab al-Suffa or Ahl al-Suffa (the People of the Veranda) in the following words: “Know that all Moslems are agreed that the Apostle had a number of Companions, who abode in his Mosque and engaged in devotion, renouncing the world and refusing to seek a livelihood. God reproached the Apostle on their account and said: ‘Do not drive away those that call on their Lord morning and evening, seeking only to gain His Face’ (Qur’an 6:52). . . . . . It is related by Ibn Abbas that the Apostle passed by the People of the Veranda, and saw their poverty and their self-mortification and said: Rejoice! for whoever of my community perseveres in the state in which you are, and is satisfied with his condition, he shall be one of my comrades in Paradise.’ [p. 81]. The Ahl al-Suffa included, among others, Bilal ibn al-Rabah, Salman al-Farisi, Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, Khabbab ibn al-Aratt, Abdullah ibn Umar, and Abdullah ibn Masud (RadiyaíLlahu anhum)” [p. 81].

No discussion of Tasawwuf would be complete without mentioning the work of Imam al-Ghazzali. In his essay on Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Professor Muntansir Mir writes: “. . . Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, medieval Muslim theologian, jurist, and mystic. He gained distinction in the court of the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk, and at the age of thirty-four he was appointed professor at the Nizamiyah College at Baghdad. After teaching there for several years, al-Ghazzali suffered a crisis of confidence. Losing faith in the efficacy and purpose of the learning he has acquired and was now disseminating, he searched for the truth and certitude that alone could set his moral doubt at rest. He left his position at the Nizamiyah, withdrew from practical life, and spent eleven years in travel, meditation, and reflection. When he returned he had found the object of his search – in sufism. The details of al-Ghazzali’s quest for knowledge that would give certitude are found in his autobiography, Al-munqidh min al-dalal (Deliverer from Error). Al-Ghazzali tells us that, of the four groups of people who claimed to be in possession of the truth, only the sufis, who walked the right path, because they combined knowledge with action, had sincerity of purpose, and actually experienced the serenity and contentment that comes from direct illumination of the heart by God.

References:

Al Quran & Hadith.

Lecturing Notes ICAS from Muhammad Bagir.MA (Islamic Mysticism).

Lecturing Notes ICAS from Prof. Mulyadhi Kartanegara (Islamic Philosophy).

1. Mystical philosophy as Islamic philosophy

It is important at the outset to ask what is meant by mystical philosophy in the context of the Islamic philosophical tradition. The term in Arabic …

closest to the phrase ‘mystical philosophy’ would perhaps be al-hikmat al-dhawqiyya, literally ‘tasted philosophy or wisdom’, which etymologically corresponds exactly to sapience from the Latin root sapere, meaning to taste. As understood in English, however, the term ‘mystical philosophy’ would include other types of thought in the Islamic context, although al-hikmat al-dhawqiyya was at its heart. Al-hikmat al-dhawqiyya is usually contrasted with discursive philosophy, or al-hikmat al-bahthiyya. Mystical philosophy in Islam would have to include all intellectual perspectives, which consider not only reason but also the heart-intellect, in fact primarily the latter as the main instrument for the gaining of knowledge. If this definition is accepted, then most schools of Islamic philosophy had a mystical element, for there was rarely a rationalistic philosophy developed in Islam which remained impervious to the distinction between reason and the intellect (as nous or intellectus) and the primacy of the latter while rejecting altogether the role of the heart-intellect in gaining knowledge.

This entry concentrates on those schools which not only include but emphasize noesis and the role of the heart-intellect or illumination in the attainment of knowledge. We shall therefore leave aside the Peripatetic school, despite the mystical elements in certain works of al-Farabi, the ‘oriental philosophy’ of Ibn Sina (Nasr 1996b) and the doctrine of the intellect adopted by the Muslim Peripatetics (mashsha’un) in general. Instead, the discussion will concentrate primarily upon the Isma’ili philosophy so closely connected with Hermetic, Pythagorean and Neoplatonic teachings, the school of Illumination (ishraq) of al-Suhrawardi and his followers, certain strands of Islamic philosophy in Spain and later Islamic philosophy in Persia and India. However, it would also have to include the doctrinal formulations of Sufism and its metaphysics from al-Ghazali and Ibn al-’Arabi to the present.

2. Isma’ili and Hermetic philosophy

Isma’ili philosophy was among the earliest to be formulated in Islam going back to the Umm al-kitab (The Mother of Books) composed in the second century ah (eighth century ad). It expanded in the fourth century ah (tenth century ad) with Abu Hatim al-Razi and Hamid al-Din Kirmani and culminated with Nasir-i Khusraw (Corbin 1993, 1994). By nature this whole philosophical tradition was esoteric in character and identified philosophy itself with the inner, esoteric and therefore mystical dimension of religion. It was concerned with the hermeneutic interpretation (ta’wil) of sacred scripture and saw authentic philosophy as a wisdom which issues from the instructions of the Imam (who is identified on a certain level with the heart-intellect), the figure who is able to actualize the potentialities of the human intellect and enable it to gain divine knowledge. The cosmology, psychology and eschatology of Isma’ilism are inextricably connected with its Imamology and the role of the Imam in initiation into the divine mysteries. All the different schools of Isma’ili philosophy, therefore, must be considered as mystical philosophy despite notable distinctions between them, especially, following the downfall of the Fatimids, between the interpretations of those who followed the Yemeni school of Isma’ilism and those who accepted Hasan al-Sabbah and ‘The Resurrection of Alamut’ in the seventh century ah (thirteenth century ad).

Two of the notable philosophical elements associated with Shi’ism in general and Isma’ilism in particular during the early centuries of Islamic history are Hermetism and Pythagoreanism, the presence of which is already evident in that vast corpus of writings associated with Jabir ibn Hayyan, who was at once alchemist and philosopher. The philosophical dimension of the Jabirian corpus is certainly of a mystical nature, having incorporated much of Hermeticism into itself, as are later works of Islamic alchemy which in fact acted as channels for the transmission of Hermetic philosophy to the medieval West. When one thinks of the central role of Hermeticism in Western mystical philosophy, one must not forget the immediate Islamic origin of such fundamental texts as the Emerald Tablet and the Turba Philosophorum, and therefore the significance of such works as texts of Islamic mystical philosophy. Obviously, therefore, one could not speak of Islamic mystical philosophy without mentioning at least the Hermetical texts integrated into Islamic thought by alchemists as well as philosophers and Sufis, and also Hermetic texts written by Muslim authors themselves. It should be recalled in this context in fact that the philosopher Ibn Sina had knowledge of certain Hermetic texts such as Poimandres and the Sufi Ibn al-’Arabi displays vast knowledge of Hermeticism in his al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and many other works (Sezgin 1971).

3. Illuminationist philosophy

Perhaps the most enduring and influential school of mystical philosophy in Islam came into being in the sixth century ah (twelfth century ad) with Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi, who founded the school of ishraq or Illumination. Al-Suhrawardi’s basic premise was that knowledge is available to man not through ratiocination alone but also, and above all, through illumination resulting from the purification of one’s inner being. He founded a school of philosophy which some have called theosophy in its original sense, that is, mystical philosophy through and through but without being against logic or the use of reason. In fact, al-Suhrawardi criticized Aristotle and the Muslim Peripatetics on logical grounds before setting about expounding the doctrine of ishraq. This doctrine is based not on the refutation of logic, but of transcending its categories through an illuminationist knowledge based on immediacy and presence, or what al-Suhrawardi himself called ‘knowledge by presence’ (al-’ilm al-huduri), in contrast to conceptual knowledge (al-’ilm al-husuli) which is our ordinary method of knowing based on concepts (Ha’iri Yazdi 1992).

In his masterpiece Hikmat al-ishraq (The Philosophy of Illumination), translated by the foremost Western student of al-Suhrawardi, Henry Corbin, as Le Livre de la Sagesse Orientale (The Book of Oriental Wisdom), the Master of Illumination presents an exposition of a form of mystical philosophy which has had a following up to the present day. Based upon the primacy of illumination by the angelic lights as the primary means of attaining authentic knowledge, the school of ishraq in fact was instrumental in bestowing a mystical character upon nearly all later Islamic philosophy, which drew even closer to Islamic esotericism or Sufism than in the earlier centuries of Islamic history without ever ceasing to be philosophy. Although the wedding between philosophy and mysticism in Islam is due most of all to the gnostic and sapiential nature of Islamic spirituality itself, on the formal level it is most of all the school of Illumination or ishraq which was instrumental in actualizing this wedding, as eight centuries of later Islamic philosophy bears witness (see Illuminationist philosophy).

4. Philosophy in the Maghrib and Spain

The rise of intellectual activity in the Maghrib and, especially, Andalusia was associated from the beginning with an intellectual form of Sufism in which Ibn Masarra was to play a central role. Most of the later Islamic philosophers of this region possessed a mystical dimension, including even the Peripatetics Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl. The former’s Tadbir al-mutawahhid (Regimen of the Solitary), far from being a political treatise, deals in reality with man’s inner being. Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqzan (Living Son of the Awake), interpreted by many in the West in naturalistic and rationalistic terms, is a symbolic account of the wedding between the partial and universal intellect within the human being, a wedding which results consequently in the confirmation of revelation that is also received through the archangel of revelation, who is none other than the objective embodiment of the universal intellect.

5. Illuminationist thought in the East

In eastern lands of the Islamic world and especially Persia, which was the main theatre for the flourishing of Islamic philosophy from the seventh century ah (thirteenth century ad) onward, primarily mystical philosophy was dominant during later centuries despite the revival of the discursive philosophy of the mashsha’is, such as Ibn Sina, by Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and others. It was in the East in the seventh and eighth centuries ah (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries ad) that the doctrines of ishraq with its emphasis on inner vision and illumination were revived by al-Suhrawardi’s major commentators, Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi, who was also a master of Ibn Sinan philosophy. The next three centuries saw mystical ideas and doctrines become ever more combined with the philosophical theses of the earlier schools, and figures such as Ibn Turkah Isfahani sought consciously to combine the teachings of Ibn Sina, al-Suhrawardi and Ibn al-’Arabi.

This tendency culminated in the tenth century ah (sixteenth century ad) with the establishment of the School of Isfahan by Mir Damad and the foremost metaphysician of later Islamic thought, Mulla Sadra, in whom the blending of ratiocination, inner illumination and revelation became complete (Corbin 1972). In this school the most rigorous logical discourse is combined with illumination and direct experience of ultimate reality, as seen so amply in Mulla Sadra’s masterpiece al-Asfar al-arba’ah (The Four Journeys). This later Islamic philosophy is certainly mystical philosophy, relying as it does on ‘experiential’ knowledge and direct vision of ultimate reality and the angelic worlds, a vision that is associated with the eye of the heart (‘ayn al-qalb orchism-i dil). However, it is also a philosophy in which the categories of logic are themselves seen as ladders for ascent to the world of numinous reality in accordance with the Islamic perspective, in which what would be called Islamic mysticism from a Christian perspective is of a gnostic (‘irfani) and sapiental nature, Islamic mysticism being essentially a path of knowledge of which love is the consort, rather than a way of love exclusive of knowledge.

6. Sufism and the Akbarian tradition

No treatment of mystical philosophy in Islam would be complete without a discussion of doctrinal Sufism and Sufi metaphysics, although technically speaking in Islamic civilization a clear distinction has always been made between philosophy (al-falsafa or al-hikma) and Sufi metaphysics and gnosis (al-ma’rifah, ‘irfan). However, as the term ‘mystical philosophy’ is understood in English, it would certainly include Sufi metaphysical and cosmological doctrines which were not explicitly formulated until the sixth and seventh centuries ah (twelfth and thirteenth centuries ad) although their roots are to be found in the Qur’an and hadith and the sayings and writings of the early Sufis. The first Sufi authors who turned to an explicit formulation of Sufi metaphysical doctrines were Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali in his later esoteric treatise such as Mishkat al-anwar (The Niche of Lights) and al-Risalat al-laduniyya (Treatise on Divine Knowledge), and ‘Ayn al-Qudat Hamadani who followed a generation after him.

References and further reading:

Chittick, W. (1989) The Sufi Path of Knowledge, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (The standard account of the nature of mystical knowledge).

Chittick, W. (1994) Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-’Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. (An analysis of the concept of the mundus imaginalis).

Chodkiewicz, M. (1993) Seal of the Saints – Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabi, trans. L. Sherrard, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society. (Close account of the key concepts of prophecy and sainthood).

Corbin, H. (1972) En Islam iranien (On Persian Islam) Paris: Gallimard. (The most important collection of sources of Persian philosophy).

Corbin, H. (1993) The History of Islamic Philosophy, in collaboration with S.H. Nasr and O. Yahya, trans. P. Sherrard, London: Kegan Paul International. (The first history to lay proper emphasis on Persian philosophy).

Lecturing Notes from Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara ( Islamic Philosophy ).

File dalam format MS Excel dapat didownload di

http://rapidshare.com/files/163634262/Indeks_Quran.xls

Untuk mengkaji kedua aliran ini mari kita lihat dalil-dali apa yang mendasari masing-masing paham ini.

Dalil-dalil yang menyokong aliran Jabariyah antara lain adalah

“Tiada suatu bencanapun yang menimpa di bumi dan (tidak pula) pada dirimu sendiri melainkan telah tertulis dalam Kitab (Lauhul Mahfuzh) sebelum kami menciptakannya. (Al Hadiid 22)”

“Bukanlah engkau yang melontar ketika engkau melontar (musuh), tetapi Allahlah yang melontar (mereka) (Al Anfal 17)”

“Tidak engkau menghendaki, kecuali Allah menghendaki, sesungguhnya Allah maha mengetahui dan bjaksana (Al Insan 30)”

“Jika kami menghendaki sesuatu, kami bersabda “Terjadilah“, maka ia pun terjadilah (An Nahl 40)

Adapun dalil-dalil yang menokong aliran Qadariah adalah sebagai berikut :

“Dan Katakanlah : “Kebenaran itu datangnya dari Tuhanmu; Maka barangsiapa yang ingin ( beriman ) hendaklah ia beriman, dan barangsiapa yang ingin ( kafir ) Biarlah ia kafir ( Al Kahfi 29 )”

“Perbuatlah apa yang kamu kehendaki, sesungguhnya dia Maha Melihat apa yang kamu kerjakan.“

“Sesungguhnya Allah tidak merobah keadaan sesuatu kaum sehingga mereka merobah keadaan yang ada pada diri mereka sendiri (Ar Ra’ad 11)”

“Allah menciptakan kamu dan apa yang kamu perbuat (As Shoffat 96)”

Inilah dalil –dalil yang diusung oleh masing-masing paham ini. Namun yang menjadi persoalan adalah bagaimana wacana ini menyokong perdaban islam di masa depan? Apakah akan muncul paham tegah yang menjembatani kedua paham ini? Karena jaman sekarang sulit ditemui lagi paham murni dari masing-masing aliran. Berikut adalah paparan pendapat dari suatu komunitas yang mengulas kedua paham ini.

Tauhid kepada Allah sebagai Pengaruh Mutlak Yang Mandiri merupakan salah satu pengetahuan yang bernilai tinggi dan berperan besar dalam pembinaan umat manusia. Oleh karena itu, Al-Qur’an sangat menekankan dan menyampaikannya dengan ungkapan yang beragam sehingga dapat dipahami secara benar. Di antara ungkapan-ungkapan tersebut ialah bahwa setiap kejadian di alam ini terwujud dengan izin,  masyi’ah, kehendak, qadha’ dan qadar Allah.

Pemahaman yang benar atas persoalan ini, di samping memerlukan kematangan akal pikiran, juga membutuhkan kepada pengkajian dan penafsiran yang benar. Mereka yang tidak memiliki pencerahan akal yang semestinya, tidak mau berusaha menimba ajaran-ajaran para imam yang maksum dan penafsir hakiki Al-Qur’an, akan tergelincir dalam menafsirkan persoalan di atas itu sedemikian rupa sehingga menisbahkan segala pengaruh sebab-akibat hanya kepada Allah Swt., sembari menafikan pengaruh apapun dari sebab-sebab dan perantara, padahal penafsiran ini bertolak belakang dengan keterangan Al-Qur’an. Mereka berusaha meyakinkan kita misalnya akan kebiasaan (‘adah) Allah yang berlaku pada munculnya panas dari api, atau pada rasa kenyang dan segar  setelah makan dan minum. Tanpa kebiasaan Allah, pada dasarnya api, makanan dan air itu tidak punya pengaruh sedikit pun dalam kejadian panas, kenyang ataupun hilangnya dahaga.

Konsekuensi buruk dari penyimpangan ini menjadi lebih jelas apabila kita mengkaji dampak-dampaknya pada tindakan-tindakan bebas manusia dan tanggung jawabnya. Bahwa timbulnya pemikiran ini adalah akibat penisbahan langsung segala tindakan manusia kepada Allah dan menafikan manusia sebagai pelaku tindakan dirinya secara mutlak. Atas dasar ini, tentu tidak seorangpun yang akan dimintai tanggung jawab atas tindakannya.

Dengan kata lain, bahwa dampak-dampak buruk pemikiran tersebut ialah keyakinan terhadap determinisime (keterpaksaan manusia)  dan menampik tanggung jawab. Hal itu berarti menafikan ciri khas manusia yang paling penting, dan tidak bermanfaatnya setiap sistem pendidikan, moral, dan hukum, termasuk juga di antaranya syariat Islam.

Karena, jika kita mencabut kehendak bebas dari diri manusia atas tindakannya sendiri, tentu tidak lagi tersisa tanggung jawab, tugas, perintah, larangan, pahala dan siksa. Bahkan dapat melazimkan sia-sianya sistem alam itu; tanpa tujuan apapun di dalamnya. Sebab, penciptaan alam semesta ini sebagaimana dijelaskan dalam ayat-ayat dan hadis-hadis serta dalil-dalil rasional adalah untuk menyiapkan lahan yang sesuai bagi penciptaan manusia agar dapat mencapai kesempurnaannya dan kedekatan dirinya di sisi Allah swt. Sehingga ia layak mendapatkan anugerah-Nya, yaitu dengan cara menjalankan berbagai kewajiban Ilahi secara sadar dan bebas.

Adapun, asumsi bahwa manusia itu tidak memiliki kehendak bebas dan tanggung jawab, ia tidaklah berhak memperoleh pahala, kesenangan abadi dan keridhaan Ilahi. Dengan demikian, tujuan dari penciptaan manusia akan gugur, undang-undang penciptaan itu akan berubah menjadi pentas besar permainan; layaknya boneka yang bergerak dan memainkan perannya tanpa kehendak dan kebebasan pada dirinya, kemudian ia dihujat dan disiksa, atau disanjung dan diganjar mulia.

Faktor terpenting yang memperluas pemikiran yang berbahaya ini ialah ambisi politis pihak penguasa zalim. Mereka menjadikannya sebagai pembenaran  atas perilaku busuk mereka, menyiasati rakyat awam untuk menerima pemerintahan zalimnya, dan meredam protes serta penentangan mereka. Maka, paham Jabariyah (determinisme) merupakan cara efektif yang utama untuk membius rakyat.

Ada sebagian orang yang sadar akan bahaya Jabariyah, akan tetapi karena tidak memiliki kemampuan untuk menolak paham itu sekaligus komit pada Tauhid yang sempurna, dan tidak berusaha menggali ajaran-ajaran Ahlul Bait yang suci nun mulia, mereka malah jatuh ke dalam paham tafwidh dan Qodariyah (kebebasan mutlak manusia). Mereka menganggap bahwa tindakan bebas manusia itu di luar jangkauan tindakan Allah. Dengan begitu, sebenarnya mereka telah terjebak ke dalam bentuk lain dari penyimpangan pemikiran, dan telah merenggang jauh dari ajaran Islam.

Sementara mereka yang memiliki kesiapan pengetahuan yang memadai dan mengenal para pengajar dan penafsir hakiki Al-Qur’an, senantiasa terjaga dari penyimpangan-penyimpangan tersebut. Dari sisi lain, mereka percaya bahwa perbuatan mereka itu bersumber dari kekuatan yang Allah berikan kepada mereka, sehingga mereka bertanggung jawab atas perbuatannya masing-masing. Dari sisi lain, merekapun menyadari adanya pengaruh Allah yang mandiri pada levelnya yang lebih tinggi, sehingga mereka mendapatkan kesimpulan yang jernih.

Di dalam hadis-hadis  para imam As yang sampai kepada kita, terdapat keterangan-keterangan brilian mengenai masalah ini, yang tercatat di dalam kitab-kitab hadis di bawah judul “Kemampuan dan Menafikan Keterpaksaan dan Kebebasan mutlak”. Selain itu juga dicatat di dalam bab-bab; Izin, Masyi’ah, Iradah, Qadha’ dan Qadar Ilahi. Terdapat sebagian hadis yang melarang orang yang minim kesiapan untuk mendalami persoalan-persoalan rumit tersebut, agar mereka tidak tertimpa penyimpangan.

Benar bahwa masalah determinisme dan kehendak bebas ini menyimpan berbagai dimensi. Meski bukti ini tidak relevan untuk mengulas semua dimensi itu, kami akan berusaha membahas beberapa di antaranya,  mengingat pentingnya masalah ini, tentunya dengan metode yang sederhana. Perlu kami tekankan pula kepada mereka yang ingin meneliti lebih dalam agar bersabar dan tekun dalam mengkaji dasar-dasar  filosofis masalah ini.

Penjelasan seputar Kehendak Bebas

Pada hakikatnya, kemampuan memilih dan mengambil keputusan merupakan salah satu yang begitu gamblang disadari oleh manusia. Karena, setiap orang menyadari kemampuan itu dengan pengetahuan hudhuri (presentif) yang tidak mungkin mengalami kekeliruan. Sebagaimana juga dengan pengetahuan hudhuri ini ia dapat merasakan kondisi jiwanya.  Seandainya ia ragu akan sesuatu, tentu ia tidak ragu akan keraguannya ini, sebab ia mengetahui kondisi ragunya itu secara hudhuri, dan ia tidak mungkin ragu akan pengetahuan semacam ini.

Begitu pula, setiap orang dapat mengetahui hanya dengan sedikit konsentrasi pada dirinya bahwa ia mampu berbicara  atau tidak. Atau, dia yakin akan kemampuannya untuk menggerakkan tangannya atau mendiamkannya. Dia pun mampu untuk menelan makanan atau tidak.

Kehendak untuk melakukan satu perbuatan itu terkadang untuk memenuhi dorongan naluri hewani, seperti rasa lapar yang mendorong seseorang untuk makan dan rasa haus yang mendorongnya untuk minum, atau terkadang untuk memenuhi kebutuhan akal dan untuk merealisasikan nilai insani yang mulia, seperti seorang pasien yang meminum obat yang pahit dengan harapan pulih. Untuk tujuan mulia ini, ia rela untuk  menahan dirinya dari mengkonsumsi makanan yang ia sukai. Atau pelajar yang meninggalkan kenikmatan duniawi demi memperoleh ilmu dan hakikat kebenaran serta tabah dalam menjalani berbagai kesulitan. Juga seperti prajurit yang gagah berani, sekalipun harus mengorbankan nyawanya demi meraih cita-citanya yang tinggi.

Pada hakikatnya, nilai seseorang itu akan tampak tatkala berbagai keinginannya saling berbenturan. Untuk mencapai kesempurnaan ruhani yang abadi, qurb (kedekatan) dan  keridhaan Ilahi, ia akan menepikan hasrat-hasrat hewaninya yang rendah. Dan setiap tindakan yang dilakukannya secara lebih disadari, akan berpengaruh lebih kuat pula dalam penyempurnaan atau mengerdilan jiwanya, serta akan mewu-judkan kelayakan yang lebih besar dalam menerima pahala atau siksa.

Jelas bahwa kemampuan untuk melawan berbagai  desakan hawa nafsunya tidaklah sama rata di antara semua orang dan dalam kaitannya dengan segala sesuatu. Kendati demikian, setiap orang, sedikit-banyaknya, memiliki anugerah Ilahi (kehendak bebas) ini. Dan, semakin ia melatih kemampuan resistensi ini, semakin ia dapat menguatkan kehendak bebasnya itu.

Oleh karena itu, kita sama sekali tidak ragu akan adanya kehendak bebas di dalam jiwa setiap manusia. Dan jangan sampai perkara yang sudah jelas ini dikeruhkan oleh berbagai keraguan. Karena bahwasanya realitas kehendak bebas itu merupakan dasar yang begitu jelas telah diterima oleh semua sistem pendidikan, moral serta agama-agama samawi.

Tanpa kehendak bebas, tidak akan tersisa lagi peluang untuk validitas sebuah hak dan tanggung jawab, sanjungan dan hujatan, pahala dan siksa.  Apa yang mengakibatkan keraguan terhadap hakikat yang jelas serta mengarah kepada paham Jabariyah yaitu munculnya sejumlah keraguan yang harus dijawab secara tuntas. Untuk itu, kami akan berusaha mendiskusikannya secara padat sebagaimana di bawah ini.

Menjawab Jabariyah

Keraguan-keraguan paling serius yang dilontarkan oleh para penganut Jabariyah adalah berikut ini:

Keraguan pertama: kehendak seseorang itu muncul lantaran bangkitnya hasrat-hasrat subjektif dari dalam dirinya. Pada gilirannya, hasrat-hasrat ini bangkit bukan karena kehendak bebasnya, bukan pula karena faktor-faktor dari luar dirinya. Maka itu, tidak ada lagi tempat untuk sebuah pemilihan dan kehendak bebas.

Jawab: bangkitnya hasrat-hasrat itu merupakan lahan penyiap untuk kehendak. Timbulnya kehendak seseorang untuk melakukan suatu tindakan bukanlah kejadian determinatif dari bangkitnya hasrat-hasrat tersebut, sehingga kemampuannya menjadi hilang. Bukti atas hal itu ialah munculnya keadaan ragu dan bimbang pada diri manusia dalam berbagai kasus. Dalam keadaan ini, untuk mengambil suatu keputusan, ia perlu merenung, berpikir serta mempertim-bangkan untung ruginya suatu tindakan. Dan terkadang ia menemui kesulitan dalam melakukan semua ini.

Keraguan kedua: telah dibuktikan dalam berbagai disiplin  ilmu, bahwa terdapat berbagai faktor yang  heterogen yang mempunyai pengaruh dan peranan di dalam membentuk kehendak umat manusia. Faktor-faktor itu seperti keturunan dan pengaruh yang diakibatkan oleh bahan-bahan makanan dan obat-obatan tertentu. Demikian pula faktor-faktor sosial. Sesungguhnya beragamnya umat manusia  di dalam tingkah laku dan Yang perlu diperhatikan pula, bahwasanya teks-teks agama itu mendukung dari dekat ataupun dari jauh, sedikit atau pun banyak adanya pandangan dan pemikiran semacam ini. Oleh karena itu, tidaklah bisa diterima adanya pandangan yang menyatakan bahwa perbuatan seseorang itu timbul dari kehendak bebasnya.

Jawab: keyakinan terhadap adanya ikhtiar dan kehendak yang bebas itu tidak berarti menolak faktor-faktor ini serta pengaruh dan peranannya. Bahkan hal itu berarti bahwa meskipun faktor-faktor itu telah ada, akan tetapi manusia  mempunyai pilihan dan kemampuan untuk melakukan perla-wanan. Ketika terjadi pertentangan di dalam dorongan-dorongan yang bermacam-macam, didapati bahwa seseorang itu mempunyai kemampuan untuk memilih sebagiannya.

Tentunya, faktor-faktor yang dominan  akan menjadi sulit untuk  dilawan, sesulit memilih suatu pekerjaan yang menentang keinginan-keinginannya. Akan tetapi, perlawanan dan pemi-lihan yang sulit semacam ini akan lebih berpengaruh pada kesempurnaan insani dan pada upaya meraih  ganjaran yang berlipat ganda. Sebagaimana pula terkadang sebagian kondisi yang menggoncangkan serta interaksi-interaksi yang tajam, atau sebagian kondisi yang sulit merupakan sebab peringanan siksa atau penurunan tingkat kejahatan.

Keraguan ketiga: bahwa Allah Swt Mahatahu akan segala fenomena dan makhluk di alam semesta. Di antaranya, Allah mengetahui seluruh perbuatan-perbuatan manusia sebelum kejadiannya. Dan pengetahuan Ilahi itu tidak akan salah. Maka setiap fenomena itu pasti akan terjadi sesuai dengan ilmu azali yang abadi dan tidak mungkin bertentangan dengannya. Jadi tidak  ada lagi peluang bagi manusia untuk memilih dan berkehendak bebas.

Jawab: pada hakikatnya, pengetahuan Allah itu berhubungan dengan setiap fenomena yang sesuai dengan kenya-taannya, dan perbuatan sengaja manusia itu telah diketahui oleh Allah sesuai dengan kenyatannya, yaitu bahwa perbuatan tersebut bersifat disengaja dan dikehendaki. Apabila perbuatan sengaja tersebut terjadi secara deterministik dan tak terpaksa, pengetahuan Allah berarti salah.

Misalnya, Allah Swt. mengetahui bahwa si fulan pada kondisi tertentu akan melakukan suatu perbuatan. Pengetahuan Ilahi ini tidak berhubungan hanya dengan perbuatan itu; terlepas dari berawalnya perbuatan tersebut dari kehendak si fulan itu. Akan tetapi, Allah mengetahui perbuatan itu sebagai sebuah kejadian yang muncul dari kehendak si fulan. Dengan demikian, ilmu Ilahi yang azali itu tidak menafikan kehendak bebas manusia.

Keraguan lain berkaitan dengan masalah qadha’ dan qadar yang –menurut mereka-  tidak sesuai dengan kehendak bebas manusia. Hal tersebut membutuhkan pembahasan lain.

Gambar lainnya bisa dilihat di http://www.islamcan.com/miracles/index.shtml?

LEBAH YANG MENULIS “ALLAHU”
(Those who are familiar with Arabic will easily be able to identify what this beehive spells – “Allahu”)

Akan terlihat dengan jelas lafal “Allah” pada batu permata tersebut bila disinari dengan cahaya

Mawar Merah di Angkasa
“Selain itu (sungguh ngeri) ketika langit pecah belah lalu menjadilah ia mawar merah, berkilat seperti minyak” (Ar-Rahman: 37)

Gambar di atas adalah gambar ledakan bintang di angkasa yang diperoleh NASA dengan Teleskop yang sangat canggih.  Kejadian tersebut membuktikan kebenaran Al-Quran yang diturunkan 14 abad yang lalu pada surah Ar-Rahman di atas

POHON YANG SEDANG RUKU
This is a recently discovered phenomenon in a forest near Sidney. As you can see, the bottom half of the tree trunk is bowed in such a way that it resembles a person in a posture of Islamic prayer – the ‘ruku’. Looking closer you can see the ‘hands’ resting on the knees. the most amazing thing is that the ‘man’ is directly facing the Kaaba, Mecca which is the direction Muslims all over the world face when in prayer.

Sesungguhnya ALLAH Maha berkuasa dan dapat menjadikan apa saja yang pernah ataupun tidak pernah terfikir oleh manusia.Ini merupakan keajaiban alam ciptaan ALLAH.

THE FISH TESTIFIES THE PROPHET (S.A.W)
The story of the fish began when Mr. Goerge Wehbi, a Christian Lebanese, was practicing his fishing hobby, in Dakar Senegal (the Capital of West Africa). He caught many fish. When the went home his wife saw among them a strange fish about 50cm length, with some arabic writing on it. He took it to Sheikh al-Zein, who read clearly what was writen in a natural way. That could not be done by a human being, but rather a Godly Creation which the fish was born with. He read “God’s Servant” on its belly and “Muhammad” near its head, and “His Messenger” on its tail

LAA ILAA HA ILLALLAH WRITEN IN BRANCHES
One brother on Germany wrote and sent this photo. “The branches clearly say in Arabic that- There is no god but Allah. This is said to be a scene on a piece of cultivated farmland in Germany. Many Germans have been said to have embraced Islam upon seeing this miraculous sight and that the German government put steel fences around the part of the farm to prevent people from visiting and witnessing this miraculous site”

Lapadz “Allah” yang terbentuk di telingan seorang bayi

Awan yang membentuk Lapadz “Allah”, kejadian ini diabadikan oleh seseorang di Mekkah

MEKKAH BERKILAU –Ini adalah hasil pencitraan dari IKONOS Satelite milik Space Imaging Inc, AS. Masjidil Haram yang ‘diintai’ oleh AS pada 31 Oktober 1999 itu menampilkan fenomena menakjubkan. Terlihat di gambar hanya bagian Masjidil Haram saja yang berkilau sementara bangunan di sekitarnya tampak lebih gelap. Subhanallah. (NASA Astronomy Picture of The Day) (sumber : http://www.spaceimaging.com/gallery/ioweek/archive/01-12-09/index.htm)

MOSQUE STILL STANDS AFTER EARTQUAKE IN TURKEY
A mosque still stands amidst the rubble of collapsed buildings in this aerial view of a neigborhood in the western Turkish town of Golcuk, 60 miles east of Istanbul, August 19, 1999. The death toll from western Turkey’s worst recorded eartquake surpassed 6,000, as hope waned of finding any of the thousands still missing under the mountains of rubble.

Menurut pemiliknya kalau dilihat dari dekat Gambar di bawah menunjukkan

kalimah “Lailahaillah” terbentuk pada seekor ikan

Dari berbagai sumber di internet

]]> http://imaduddinwahid.wordpress.com/2008/11/03/kebesaran-allah/feed/ 0 imaduddinwahid lebah-yang-menulis-allahu batu-permata-bertuliskan-allah mawar-merah-angkasa pohon-yang-sedang-ruku_1 pohon-yang-sedang-ruku_2 tomat-bertuliskan-allah the-fish-testifies-the-prophet-saw laa-ilaa-ha-illallah-writen-in-branches lapadz-allah-yang-terbentuk-di-telingan-seorang-bayi awan-yang-membentuk-lapadz-allah mekkah-berkilau mosque-still-stands-after-eartquake-in-turkey lailahaillah_1 lailahaillah_2 bukit-bentuk-muka http://imaduddinwahid.wordpress.com/2008/11/02/saya-rela-menjadi-tongkat-ibu-sepanjang-hidupku/ http://imaduddinwahid.wordpress.com/2008/11/02/saya-rela-menjadi-tongkat-ibu-sepanjang-hidupku/#comments Sun, 02 Nov 2008 10:44:53 +0000 imaduddinwahid http://imaduddinwahid.wordpress.com/?p=178 ]]>

Hawa udara di Changchun, Tiongkok, sangatlah dingin. Li Yuanyuan memanggul sang ibu yang lumpuh kedua kakinya sambil menggendong putrinya yang berusia dua tahun buru-buru ke rumah sakit karena sang ibu terkena serangan jantung lagi. Orang-orang yang berlalu lalang di jalan memandang mereka bertiga dengan mata terbelalak, semua takjub melihat seorang wanita yang kelihatannya kurus lemah justru memiliki tenaga untuk memanggul satu orang sambil menggendong satu lagi…….

Menurut laporan “City Evening Post”, di pagi buta, 13 Pebruari 2008, Li Yuanyuan telah memakaikan baju bagi anak dan sang ibu yang baru sembuh dari sakitnya. Jam 10 pagi, Yuanyuan berjongkok di depan sang ibu, meletakkan kedua kaki ibu di pinggangnya lalu memanggul sang ibu, kemudian menggendong putrinya yang berdiri di atas tempat tidur.

Kedua tangan Yuanyuan dipakai untuk menyangga sang ibu, sedangkan sang ibu membantu merangkul cucunya mengitari leher Yuanyuan. Dengan cara inilah tiga orang tersebut saling berangkulan dengan susah payah keluar dari rumah sakit. Sang ibu telah lumpuh selama 21 tahun, selama 21 tahun itu pulalah Yuanyuan terbiasa memanggul sang ibu keluar masuk rumah sakit.

Ketika Yuanyuan berusia 7 tahun terjadilah sebuah kecelakaan lalu lintas yang benar-benar telah merubah kehidupannya. Karena kecelakaan ini ibunda mengalami kelumpuhan pada kedua kaki yang diperparah dengan menghilangnya sang ayah. Sejak saat itu, Yuanyuan menjadi tulang punggung rumah tangga. Karena tidak ada penghasilan Yuanyuan menghidupi keluarga dengan menjadi pemulung, uang hasil kerja kerasnya habis terpakai untuk mengurus sang ibu.

Rasa bakti Yuanyuan kepada orang tua sangat menyentuh hati para tetangga, banyak tetangga yang dengan sukarela memberi bantuan kepada sang ibu dan putrinya ini. Karena sepanjang tahun hanya mampu berebahan, otot kaki sang ibu sering kejang, sakitnya tak tertahankan.

Ada seorang tetangga yang berprofesi sebagai seorang dokter tradisional tua, setiap hari membantunya memberikan terapi akupunktur terhadap ibu Yuan-yuan, bahkan mengajarnya menggunakan teknik akupunktur sederhana. Sejak berusia 11 tahun sampai sekarang, Yuanyuan sudah dapat menggunakan teknik akupunktur untuk meringankan rasa sakit ibunya.

Tiga tahun yang lalu, Yuan-yuan menikah, setahun kemudian, Yuanyuan melahirkan seorang putri. Namun di mana pun dan kapan pun, Yuanyuan tidak pernah meninggalkan sang ibu, dia dan suaminya bersama-sama memikul tanggung jawab mengurus sang ibu.

Meskipun rumah tangganya tidak terbilang kaya, mereka sangatlah puas. Sang ibu berkata, terkenang masa 21 tahun ini meskipun penuh penderitaan, namun dia sangat puas, dia merasa diri-nya sama dengan orang tua lain yang juga telah menikmati kehangatan keluarga.

Bagi Yuanyuan, selama 21 tahun ini, dia merasa dirinya sangat bahagia, karena dia adalah seorang anak yang masih memiliki seorang ibu.

“Saya rela menjadi tongkat ibu sepanjang hidupku.……” (Dajiyuan/prm)

Source: Erabaru.or.id

Islamic logic was inspired primarily by Aristotle’s logical corpus, the Organon (which according to a late Greek taxonomy also included the Rhetoric and Poetics). Islamic authors were also familiar with some elements in Stoic logic and linguistic theory, and their logical sources included not only Aristotle’s own works but also the works of the late Greek Aristotelian commentators, the Isagog of Porphyry and the logical writings of Galen. However, most of the logical work of the Islamic philosophers remained squarely within the tradition of Aristotelian logic, and most of their writings in this area were in the form of commentaries on Aristotle.

For the Islamic philosophers, logic included not only the study of formal patterns of inference and their validity but also elements of the philosophy of language and even of epistemology and metaphysics. Because of territorial disputes with the Arabic grammarians, Islamic philosophers were very interested in working out the relationship between logic and language, and they devoted much discussion to the question of the subject matter and aims of logic in relation to reasoning and speech.

In the area of formal logical analysis, they elaborated upon the theory of terms, propositions and syllogisms as formulated in Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione and Prior Analytics. In the spirit of Aristotle, they considered the syllogism to be the form to which all rational argumentation could be reduced, and they regarded syllogistic theory as the focal point of logic. Even poetics was considered as a syllogistic art in some fashion by most of the major Islamic Aristotelians.

Since logic was viewed as an organon or instrument by which to acquire knowledge, logic in the Islamic world also incorporated a general theory of argumentation focused upon epistemological aims. This element of Islamic logic centred upon the theory of demonstration found in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, since demonstration was considered the ultimate goal sought by logic. Other elements of the theory of argumentation, such as dialectics and rhetoric, were viewed as secondary to demonstration, since it was held that these argument forms produced cognitive states inferior in certitude and stability to demonstration. The philosopher’s aim was ultimately to demonstrate necessary and certain truth; the use of dialectical and rhetorical arguments was accounted for as preparatory to demonstration, as defensive of its conclusions, or as aimed at communicating its results to a broader audience.

The subject matter and aims of logic

As was their custom in discussing all the branches of philosophy, the Islamic philosophers devoted considerable attention to identifying the subject matter studied by logic and the aims at which logical studies are directed. Al-Farabi, whose logical and linguistic writings comprise the majority of his philosophical output, epitomizes the approach to logic that is characteristic of Islamic Aristotelianism. In his Ihsa’ al-’ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), he defines logic as an instrumental, rule-based science aimed at directing the intellect towards the truth and safeguarding it from error in its acts of reasoning. He defends the need for such a science of reasoning on the grounds that it is possible for the mind to err in at least some of its acts, for example, in those in which the intelligibles sought are not innate, but are rather attained discursively and empirically ‘through reflection and contemplation’. Al-Farabi compares logic to tools such as rulers and compasses, which are used to ensure exactness when we measure physical objects subject to the errors of sensation. Like these tools, logical measures can be employed by their users to verify both their own acts of reasoning and the arguments of others. Indeed, logic is especially useful and important to guide the intellect when it is faced with the need to adjudicate between opposed and conflicting opinions and authorities.

Al-Farabi’s view of logic as a rule-based science which governs the mind’s operations over intelligibles is repeated in many of his introductory logical works, and it formed the foundation for Ibn Sina’s later refinements (see Ibn Sina). In the opening chapters of his al-Madkhal (Introduction), the first logical book of his encyclopaedic work al-Shifa’ (Healing), Ibn Sina describes the purpose of logic as one of enabling the intellect to acquire ‘knowledge of the unknown from the known’. Like al-Farabi, he defends the need for logic by arguing that the innate capacities of reasoning are insufficient to ensure the attainment of this purpose, and thus they require the aid of an art. While there may be some cases in which innate intelligence is sufficient to ensure the attainment of true knowledge, such cases are haphazard at best; he compares them to someone who manages to hit a target on occasion without being a true marksman. The most important and influential innovation that Ibn Sina introduces into the characterization of logic is his identification of its subject matter as ‘second intentions’ or ‘secondary concepts’, in contrast to ‘first intentions’. This distinction is closely linked in Ibn Sina’s philosophy to his important metaphysical claim that essence or quiddity can be distinguished from existence, and that existence in turn can be considered in either of its two modes: existence in concrete, singular things in the external world; or conceptual existence in one of the soul’s sensible or intellectual faculties (see Existence).

In al-Madkhal, Ibn Sina argues that logic differs from the other sciences because it considers not conceptual existence as such (this would be psychology), but rather the accidents or properties that belong to any quiddity by virtue of its being conceptualized by the mind. These properties, according to Ibn Sina, include such things as essential and accidental predication, being a subject or being a predicate, and being a premise or a syllogism (see Logical form §1). It is these properties that allow the mind to connect concepts together in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown; they provide the foundation for the rules of reasoning and inference that logic studies. They are moreover formal properties in the sense that, as properties belonging to all concepts in virtue of their mental mode of existence, they are entirely independent of the content of the thought itself; they are indifferent to the intrinsic natures of the quiddities which they serve to link together.

In the Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics) of al-Shifa’, Ibn Sina introduces the terminology of first and second “intentions” or concepts in order to express the relation between the concepts of these quiddities themselves – which are studied in the theoretical sciences – and the concepts of the states and accidents of their mental existence which logic studies: “As you know, the subject matter of logical science is second, intelligible intentions (al-ma’ani al-ma’qula al-thaniyya) which are dependent upon the primary intelligible intentions with respect to some property by which they lead from the known to the unknown” (Ilahiyyat Book 1, ch. 2, in Anawati and Zayed 1960: 10-11). For example, the second intentions of “being a subject” and “being a predicate” are studied in logic independently of whatever first intentions function as the subject and predicate terms in a given proposition, for example, “human being” and “rational animal” in the proposition “a human being is a rational animal”. The logical second intentions depend upon the first intentions because the first intentions are the conceptual building blocks of the new knowledge which second intentions link together: but logic studies the second intentions in abstraction from whatever particular first intentions the logical relations depend upon in any given case.

Logic, language and grammar

The attention that Ibn Sina and al-Farabi devote to the proper characterization of the subject matter of logic stems in part from a concern to distinguish logic from grammar. In the ancient and medieval traditions, the study of logic was closely tied to the philosophical consideration of language (see Language, medieval theories of; Logic, ancient; Logic, medieval), and for this reason many Arabic grammarians – whose linguistic theories were developed to a high degree of complexity and sophistication – were contemptuous of the philosophers for importing Greek logic, which they saw as a foreign linguistic tradition, into the Arabic milieu. This attitude toward Greek logic is epitomized in a famous debate reported to have taken place in Baghdad in 932 between the grammarian Abu Sa’id al-Sirafi and Abu Bishr Matta, a Syriac Christian who translated some of Aristotle’s works into Arabic and is purported to have been one of al-Farabi’s teachers. The extant account of the debate is heavily biased towards al-Sirafi, who attacks logical formalism and denies the ability of logic to act as a measure of reasoning over and above the innate capacities of the intellect itself. His principal claims are that philosophical logic is nothing but Greek grammar warmed over, that it is inextricably tied to the idiom of the Greek language and that it has nothing to offer speakers of another language such as Arabic.

It is against the background of such attacks that the discussions of the relations between logic, language and grammar by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and al-Farabi’s pupil Yahya ibn ‘Adi (also a Syriac Christian and translator), are to be understood. Al-Farabi and Yahya both present essentially the same perspective on the relations between logic and language, a moderate perspective which Ibn Sina later rejects. In the Ihsa’ al-‘ulum, al-Farabi argues that logic and grammar both have some legitimate interest in language, but whereas grammatical rules primarily govern the use of language, logical rules primarily govern the use of intelligibles:

And this art (of logic) is analogous to the art of grammar, in that the relation of the art of logic to the intellect and the intelligibles is like the relation of the art of grammar to language and expressions. That is, to every rule for expressions which the science of grammar provides us, there is a corresponding (rule) for intelligibles which the science of logic provides us (Ihsa’ al-’ulum, in Amin 1968: 68).

More precisely, al-Farabi explains that although grammar and logic share a mutual concern with expressions, grammar provides rules that govern the correct use of expressions in a given language, but logic provides rules that govern the use of any language whatsoever in so far as it signifies intelligibles. Thus, logic will have some of the characteristics of a universal grammar, attending to the common features of all languages that reflect their underlying intelligible content. Some linguistic features will be studied in both logic and grammar, but logic will study them as they are common, and grammar in so far as they are idiomatic. On the basis of this comparison with grammar, then, al-Farabi is able to complete his characterization of the subject matter of logic as follows: ‘The subject-matters of logic are the things for which [logic] provides the rules, namely, intelligibles in so far as they are signified by expressions, and expressions in so far as they signify intelligibles (Ihsa’ al-’ulum, in Amin 1968: 74).

Like al-Farabi, Yahya ibn ‘Adi, in a treatise entitled Maqala fi tabyin al-fasl bayna sina’atay al-mantiq al-falsafi wa-al-nahw al-‘arab (On the Difference Between Philosophical Logic and Arabic Grammar), makes his case for the independence of logic from grammar based upon the differences between the grammar of a particular nation and the universal science of logic. He argues that the subject matter of grammar is mere expressions (al-alfaz), which it studies from the limited perspective of their correct articulation and vocalization according to Arabic conventions. The grammarian is especially concerned with language as an oral phenomenon; the logician alone is properly concerned with ‘expressions in so far as they signify meanings’ (al-alfaz al-dalla ‘ala al-ma’ani) (Maqala fi tabyin, in Endress 1978: 188). To support this claim, Yahya points out that changing grammatical inflections do not affect the basic signification of a word: if in one sentence a word occurs in the nominative case, with the appropriate vocalization, its signification remains unchanged when it is used in another sentence in the accusative case and with a different vocal ending.

In Ibn Sina’s view, however, such accounts of the logician’s interest in language and its differences from that of the grammarian did not go far enough. In keeping with his own understanding of logic as the science which studies second intentions, Ibn Sina criticized such earlier attempts to introduce linguistic concerns into the subject matter of logic. In al-Madkhal, Ibn Sina labels as ‘stupid’ those who say that ‘the subject matter of logic is speculation concerning expressions in so far as they signify meanings (ma’ani)’. However, Ibn Sina does not deny that the logician is sometimes or even often required to consider linguistic matters; his objection is to the inclusion of language as an essential constituent of the subject matter of logic. The logician is only incidentally concerned with language because of the constraints of human thought and the practical exigencies of learning and communication. Ibn Sina goes so far as to claim that, ‘if logic could be learned through pure thought so that meanings alone could be attended to in it, then it would dispense entirely with expressions’; but since this is not in fact possible, ‘the art of logic is compelled to have some of its parts come to consider the states of expressions’ (al-Madhkal, in Anawati et al. 1952: 22-3). For Ibn Sina, then, logic is a purely rational art whose purpose is entirely captured by its goal of leading the mind from the known to the unknown; only accidentally and secondarily can it be considered a linguistic art.

Conceptualization and assent

While the close links between logic and linguistic studies emerge in the Islamic philosophers’ consideration of the subject matter of logic, the links between logic and epistemology come to the fore in the consideration of the divisions within logic and the order of the books within Aristotle’s Organon. All the principal Islamic Aristotelians organize their understanding of the divisions of logic around the epistemological couplet of tasawwur (conceptualization), and tasdiq (assent), which constitute for them the two states of knowledge that logic aims to produce in the intellect.

Conceptualization is the act of the mind by which it grasps singular (though not necessarily simple) essences or quiddities, such as the concept of’ ‘human being’. Assent, by contrast, is the act of the intellect whereby it makes a determinate judgment to which a truth-value can be assigned; in fact, conceptualization is defined in Islamic philosophy principally by contrast with assent. Thus, any act of knowledge that does not entail the assignment of a truth-value to the proposition that corresponds to it will be an act of conceptualization alone, not assent. More specifically, the Islamic philosophers link assent to the affirmation or denial of the existence of the thing conceived, or to the judgment that it exists in a certain state, with certain properties. Thus, assent presupposes some prior act of conceptualization, although conceptualization does not presuppose assent.

One of the purposes of including a consideration of the tasawwur-tasdiq dichotomy in introductory discussions of the purpose of logic is to provide an epistemological foundation for the two focal points of Aristotelian logic, the definition and the syllogism (see Logical form §1). The purpose of the definition is identified as the production of an act of conceptualization, and the purpose of the syllogism is identified as causing assent to the truth of a proposition. However, since the definition and the syllogism are both considered in the Prior and Posterior Analytics and the works that come after them in the Organon, the study of the ways of producing conceptualization and assent presupposes as its foundation the study of single terms and propositions in the Categories and De interpretatione.

Predicables, categories and propositions

In keeping with the ancient Greek tradition, the Islamic philosophers considered the books of the Organon to be an ordered series which begins with the study of the signification of simple terms in the Categories and then proceeds to the study of propositions in the De interpretatione. In addition to these two Aristotelian texts, a work of the Neoplatonist Porphyry, known as the Isagog (Introduction), was appended to the beginning of this series as an introduction to the study of the Categories (see Aristotle p.7). It was concerned with the five predicables: genus, species, difference, property and accident. While all of the Islamic Aristotelians wrote commentaries on the Isagog and utilized its grouping of the predicables, not all were convinced of its utility as an introduction to Aristotle. Ibn Rushd openly expresses such doubts in the introduction to his Talkhis kitab al-maqulat (Middle Commentary on the Categories), where he indicates that his original intention was to omit the Isagog entirely from his series of middle commentaries on the Organon. At the end of his work on the Isagog itself, he explains bluntly that he does not believe that Porphyry’s text is a helpful introduction to the study of logic and questions whether it is really a logical text at all. His sole reason for completing the commentary, he tells us, was to comply with a request made by his friends.

The logical character of the Categories presented a related problem for other Islamic philosophers. In the introduction to his Sharh al-‘ibarah (Great Commentary on the De interpretatione), al-Farabi rehearses some of the controversies inherited from the Greek tradition over the relations between the Categories and the De interpretatione. As al-Farabi points out, the De interpretatione can be understood quite well without a prior knowledge of the Categories, and the former work makes no explicit references to the latter. Moreover, the De interpretatione is principally concerned with the formal relations amongst propositions, such as contradiction and contrariety, whereas the Categories is concerned with the signification or meaning of terms as such. Furthermore, in its opening chapters, the De interpretatione considers in formal terms the simple parts of which propositions are composed, that is, the noun and the verb. Despite these concerns, however, al-Farabi opts for the traditional ordering of these books on the grounds that the Categories is relevant to the whole of logic, since it studies ‘the simplest of the subject matters in which logic actualizes itself’. In his Falsafa Aristutalis (Philosophy of Aristotle), al-Farabi opts for a similar solution to the logical status of the Categories, explaining that it comprises an investigation and classification of ‘the instances of being from which the first premises are compounded’, which are ‘the primary significations of the expressions generally accepted by all’ (Falsafa Aristutalis, in Mahdi 1969: 82-3).

Al-Farabi’s misgivings in both of these texts stem from the largely ontological focus of the Aristotelian Categories, which calls into question its placement within the Organon. This concern was echoed later by Ibn Sina, who points out that many of the discussions in the Categories would be better placed in metaphysics or psychology, since they pertain to the study of expressions as directly signifying external or mental beings, in other words, to first rather than to second intentions. But since the Categories is useful in instructing us how to formulate definitions – which is one of the principal goals of logic – its placement in the Organon can be justified on practical grounds.

Islamic philosophers viewed De interpretatione as a study of the composition and truth-values of categorical propositions. Thus al-Farabi, in his great commentary on this text, explains that the term ‘interpretation’ used in the title of the work means ‘complete statement’ (al-qawl al-tamm). A complete statement, according to al-Farabi, must be one which causes a complete understanding in the mind; in other words, one in which assent occurs along with conceptualization. This is achieved principally by a simple, predicative, categorical statement (al-qawl al-jazim al-hamli al-basit) which affirms or denies a predicate of its subject.

Theory of argumentation

For the entire Islamic tradition, the crowning glory of Aristotelian logic is the syllogistic theory outlined in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, especially the latter. The purpose of logic is to provide the means whereby knowledge is to be acquired, and the most valuable type of knowledge is that which is certain and necessary, that is, knowledge gained according to the paradigm of demonstrative science laid out in the Posterior Analytics. This part of logic, in the words of al-Farabi’s Ihsa’ al-‘ulum, is ‘the strongest and pre-eminent in dignity and authority. Logic seeks its primary aim in this part alone, and the rest of its parts are only for its sake’ (Ihsa’ al-‘ulum, in Amin 1968: 89). Even the formal study of the syllogism itself is primarily undertaken for the sake of its employment in demonstrations.

In their formal syllogistic theory, the Islamic Aristotelians mainly follow Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. While they are aware of the fourth figure traditionally ascribed to Galen, the tendency is to dismiss this figure as superfluous and intuitively implausible, as Ibn Sina does in the seventh method of his al-Isharat wa-‘l-tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions); or to ignore it entirely, as al-Farabi does in his Kitab al-qiyas (Book on the Syllogism). Similarly, the Arabic philosophers knew of the alternative propositional logic of the Stoics and incorporated elements of it in their discussions of conditional or hypothetical (shartiyyah) syllogisms (see Logic, ancient). However, they did not accept the Stoic inference schemata, nor did they treat conditional connectives as truth-functional, since they did not consider the parts of conditional statements to be complete propositions in their own right. Moreover, for the Islamic logicians ‘conditional’ was a generic term which included both ‘conjunctive’ (al-muttasilat) conditionals (of the form, ‘if… then’) and ‘disjunctive’ (al-munfasilat) conditionals (of the form, ‘either… or’). Conditional syllogisms of both sorts were viewed as relying upon a process of ‘reiteration’ or ‘repetition’ (istithna’), a term which referred to the repetition of the antecedent or the consequent, or one of the two disjuncts, in so far as it formed the second premise of a syllogism. Thus in the conjunctive conditional syllogism, ‘If it is daytime, then it is light; but it is daytime, therefore it is light’, ‘it is daytime’ would be labelled the mustathna’ or reiterated premise, since it is by its restatement that the syllogism reaches its conclusion.

When we turn to the specific application of syllogistic theory to particular types of argumentation, the epistemological concerns of Islamic logic surface once more. In particular, the Islamic philosophers explained the primacy of demonstration, and the ancillary role of dialectical, rhetorical, poetic and sophistical syllogisms, by reference to the epistemic status of the premises used in each type of syllogism, and the type of assent they could produce to the conclusion of the syllogisms in which they were employed. The classification of syllogisms and their premises according to the nature of their assent is found in the logical writings of all the major Islamic philosophers, but the most complete and systematic classification of premises occurs in three of Ibn Sina’s works, al-Burhan (Demonstration), in al-Shifa’, al-Najah (Deliverance) and al-Isharat wa-‘l-tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions). Although these three accounts differ somewhat in the number and variety of the premises listed in each, generally they present a single and consistent theory. Demonstrative syllogisms are composed of premises which necessitate assent and include self-evident first principles as well as sensible, empirically evident propositions. Dialectical syllogisms are based upon generally accepted beliefs (al-mashhurat), which are equivalent to the endoxa of Aristotle’s Topics; on premises granted for the purposes of dialectical debate; and in general, on all premises assented to because they are universally accepted by all people, or by people deemed authoritative. Rhetorical syllogisms are similar to dialectical ones, except that they are accepted unreflectively and on the basis of a more limited authority, relative, for example, to a particular group or sect; as such, they are only supposed or presumed to be ‘generally-accepted beliefs’. Sophistical premises are those accepted because of some misleading resemblance to another type of premise, and poetic premises are those that produce a motion in the faculty of imagination (al-takhyil), not an act of intellectual assent.

The inclusion of rhetorical and poetical syllogisms in this enumeration reflects a common assumption among Islamic philosophers that Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics are parts of his logical Organon. This assumption was inherited by the Islamic tradition from the Greek commentators, and it was used by them in part to account for the differences between philosophical and popular modes of discourse and argumentation, particularly in the context of discussions of the relations between philosophy and religion. The Islamic philosophers held that whereas philosophers rely principally upon demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms, religious leaders and theologians generally use rhetorical and poetical syllogisms to persuade the general populace. Religion is thus viewed as an image or reflection of philosophical, demonstrative truth propounded in language and argument-forms that can be easily understood by the mass of humanity.

The place of dialectic within the theory of argumentation is perhaps the most ambivalent in Islamic logic. While dialectic is seen as inferior to demonstration, its importance for philosophy is none the less recognized. A good example of this is found in al-Farabi’s enumeration in his Kitab al-jadal (Book on Dialectic) of the ways in which dialectic serves philosophers. According to al-Farabi, dialectic hones argumentative skills, introduces the principles of the special demonstrative sciences, alerts the mind to the self-evident principles of demonstration, helps to develop communicative skills and provides the means for refuting sophistry. Of these five uses, only the fourth is external to the proper aims of philosophy and closer to the tasks usually reserved to theology and religion. The other four pertain to the learning or acquisition of truly philosophical skills, even if they lie outside the strictly demonstrative aims that are the ultimate end of philosophy.

In the case of the theory of demonstration itself, Islamic logicians organized their commentaries on the Posterior Analytics around the definition and the demonstrative syllogism as the means by which both conceptualization and assent are most perfectly attained. Al-Farabi’s Kitab al-burhan (Book on Demonstration) offers an excellent summary of the standard approach taken by Islamic philosophers to theory of demonstration and its epistemological aims. Just as he identified the categorical statement as the embodiment of perfect assent on the propositional level, here al-Farabi identifies demonstrative certitude as complete or perfect assent on the level of syllogistic inference. Moreover, certitude is defined by al-Farabi in terms of what we would now label ‘second-order’ knowledge:

Certitude is for us to believe, concerning the truth to which we have assented, that it is not possible at all for what we believe about this matter to be different from what we believe it to be; and in addition to this for us to believe, concerning our belief, that another belief is not possible – in the sense that whenever some belief about the first belief is formed, it is impossible for it to be otherwise, and so on ad infinitum.

(Kitab al-burhan, in al-’Ajam and Fakhry 1986-7, 4: 20)

Certitude requires not just knowledge of a conclusion, p, but knowing that we know p. This sort of certitude al-Farabi calls ‘necessary certitude’. However, he also allows for non-necessary certitude, which holds ‘only at a particular time’, and thus can be applied to propositions about merely contingent beings: ‘Necessary certitude and necessary existence are convertible in entailment, for what is verified as necessarily certain is necessarily existent’ (Kitab al-burhan, in al-’Ajam and Fakhry 1986-7, 4: 22). While al-Farabi recognizes both of these varieties of certitude to be forms of perfect assent, in his view necessary certitude alone fulfils the strict conditions of Aristotelian demonstration, since it alone will pertain to objects which cannot be other than they are.

Al-Farabi’s remarks on the utility of dialectic, combined with his extension of the notion of perfect assent beyond the confines of strict and necessary demonstration, illustrate the overall breadth of the Islamic philosophers’ theories of argumentation. Despite their professions of the primacy of the demonstrative paradigm within philosophy, the Islamic Aristotelians recognized a broad range of legitimate and useful argument forms and acknowledged their importance as philosophical tools leading to knowledge of the unknown.

THE MEANING OF RELIGION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH REVELATION

Religion (din) is an all-round movement in the light of faith in Allah and a sense of responsibility for the formation of thought and belief, for the promotion of high principles of human morality for the establishment of good relations among members of the society and the elimination of every sort of undue discrimination. 

Religion. There is no doubt that each member of the human race is naturally drawn to his fellow-men and that in his life in society he acts in ways which are interrelated and interconnected. One cannot perform just any act in any place or after any other act. There is an order which must be observed.

There is, therefore, an order which governs the actions man performs in the journey of this life, an order against which his actions cannot rebel. In reality, these acts all originate from a distinct source. That source is man’s desire to possess a felicitous life, a life in which he can reach to the greatest extent possible the objects of his desire, and be gratified. Or, one could say that man wishes to provide in a more complete way for his needs in order to continue his existence.

This is why man continually conforms his actions to rules and laws either devised by himself or accepted from others, and why he selects a particular way of life for himself among all the other existing possibilities. He works in order to provide for his means of livelihood and expects his activities to be guided by laws and regulations that must be followed. In order to satisfy his sense of taste and overcome hunger and thirst, he eats and drinks, for he considers eating and drinking necessary for the continuation of his own happy existence. This rule could be multiplied by many other instances.

The totality of these fundamental beliefs concerning the nature of man and the Universe, and regulations in conformity with them which are applied to human life, is called religion (din). If there are divergences in these fundamental beliefs and regulations, they are called schools such as the Sunni and Shi’ite schools in Islam and the Nestorian in Christianity. We can therefore say that man, even if he does not believe in the Deity, can never be without religion if we recognize religion as a program for life based on firm belief. Religion can never be separated from life and is not simply a matter of ceremonial acts.

Divine revelation plays a very important role in the Muslim faith. While religious books of most faiths acknowledge their human author’s contribution to the divine text, the Qur’an claims to have been revealed word by word and letter by letter. The Qur’an is therefore, no doubt, a milestone in the development of revelation literature, and its authenticity is not seriously questioned Islam knows different forms and degrees of divine revelation. See for example.

Muslims believe that God revealed his final message to humanity through Muhammad ibn Abdullah (c. 570 – July 6, 632) via the angel Gabriel.  Muhammad is considered to have been God’s final prophet, the “Seal of the Prophets“. The revelations Muhammad preached form the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an. The Qur’an is believed to be the flawless final revelation of God to humanity, valid until the day of the Resurrection.

Muslims hold that the message of Islam – submission to the will of the one God – is the same as the message preached by all the messengers sent by God to humanity since Adam. From an Islamic point of view, Islam is the oldest of the monotheistic religions because it represents both the original and the final revelation of God to Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. Members of all sects of Islam believe that the Qur’an codifies the direct words of God.

According to Islamic traditions, Muhammad began receiving revelations from God (Arabic: ألله Allah) from the age of 40, delivered through the angel Gabriel over the last 23 years of his life. The content of these revelations, known as the Qur’an, was memorized and recorded by his followers and compiled into a single volume shortly after his death. The Qur’an, along with the details of Muhammad’s life as recounted by his biographers and his contemporaries, forms the basis of Islami.  Muslims do not regard him as the founder of a new religion but as the restorer of the original monotheistic faith of Adam, Abraham and other prophets whose messages had become misinterpreted or corrupted over time (only misinterpreted according to some).

the rationality or rationalization of religion

Men have long argued over the authority that human intellect has in relation to the Divine.

The Greek philosophers are known to have impressed upon man’s ability to use logic and thus, make rational decisions. These philosophers endeavoured to induce men to not only use his intellect regarding affairs pertaining to the material world but also to the metaphysical one. A lot of social sciences built up their premises over man’s rationality alone. Essentially, this idea gradually crept into and influenced the understanding of many a Muslim scholar. Some of them, however, rejected the very idea of rationalism; they discovered an ingenious and supernatural source for making sense of the ‘reality’—Ilham (inspiration). Still another group, however, adopted a reasonable approach by not over-estimating their fragile intellect, as concerns its understanding of the workings of the Divine and thus, they effectively confined themselves to rely on the Divine Scriptures to comprehend how the Divine partakes in human life.

Imam Ghazali’s Point of View

According to Imam Ghazali, the rationality that abounds and obsesses many intellectuals is acceptable, but only as relative to the senses. These are, in turn, subject to the necessary truths, provided by the Divine inspirations – a presentation of ‘rationality’ which restrains man’s intellect with the manacles of inspirations. He is reported to have written in his autobiography, ‘Deliverance from Error’:

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, on the other hand, completely rejected this dependence of scientific proof and rationality on intuition. He questioned how two contradicting reports of mystic experiences could be accepted altogether. One had to be right, and for that, no intuition would help as it was intuition itself that bore the responsibility of the paradox. In his opinion, thus, the contradiction of the reports of mystic experience is proverbial. What criterion is there by which we can determine which of them are true and which false? Naturally, we have nothing else but reason to decide the matter’.

If I were to act in an absolutely rational manner, without consciously taking into consideration any Divine source, I would ironically be inclined to accept that both reason and innate inclinations (the God-given a priori considerations, which one cannot seem to part with) would help me make the right decision in matters of faith, rituals and life in general. Alternately, if I were to make reason subordinate to something, I would choose God’s Scripture and His guidance therein, as that ‘something’, again, ironically, without any Ilham (inspiration), as suggested by Ghazali, to be a decisive authority. Both such approaches would be subject to criticism by different scholars of Islam. However, all would agree, and very rightly so, that the Qur’an and Sunnah alone can help us establish a view most authentic in terms of its acceptability by God Almighty.

As far as the help of mystical experiences is concerned in acquiring both worldly and religious guidance, the Sunnah of the Prophet (sws) provides us with no leeway to that end. Furthermore, we look at the lives of the Companions (rta) of the Prophet (sws). They were the best of believers and they faltered like Adam (sws) faltered in the beginning, they observed like Abraham (sws) observed the stars. But as they recited from the Qur’an, they submitted to the Divine Truth; they surrendered the supreme reasoning faculty before the Divine Word and professed faith in Allah and the Hereafter without actually having seen them.  Reason, they did exercise, but as regards the matters beyond the scope of Divine Guidance – an exercise in which they also observed the norms of innate guidance. In summary, reason, in conjunction with innate guidance, does have authority over the senses but Divine Guidance reigns supreme as regards the matters which it has specifically addressed.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REASON AND FAITH

The Our’an is believed by Muslims to be the Book revealed by Allah to the unschooled Prophet Muhammad as well as kept preserved in its original form for all times to come. Obviously, faith is an important element of the religion of Islam. Initially, it insists on a few basic articles of faith such as Unity of Allah, Prophethood of Muhammad, divine origin of the Qur’an, life after death, accountability of the individual for his deeds, etc. Beyond faith, it leaves the mind of Muslims free to observe, contemplate, assimilate and draw inferences. Moreover, the faith the Our’an builds in men is not at all blind or arbitrary. It is rather sought to be substantiated by the dictates of reason and intellect.

The concept of reason that doesn’t deny God, on the other hand, is intrinsically connected with faith. In the Qur’an, reason is presented as the only valid foundation for faith as well as action. The Our’anic worldview is basically rational; irrational thinking and irrational behaviour are condemned and tantamount to disbelief.

The question of faith and reason is present in Islamic theology where the Mu’tazilites very early stated that the only avenue to knowing God is through ‘reason’ and the only avenue to understanding God’s revelation, the Qur’an, is by interpreting divine action as rational; rationality is the law according to which God acts and according to which humans should act and judge.

From this particular point of view the Our’an itself is a unique blend of faith and reason, religion and philosophy.  In summing up it may fairly be said that in Islam both reason and faith or rationalism and traditionalism are interlinked and interdependent. They are also found to be supportive of each other. None of the two can be separated from the other without causing untold suffering to humanity. It was mainly because of this balanced combination that Islam as an educational force not only inspired Muslims to cultivate knowledge and learning, but also infused in them the spirit of scientific enquiry which is the very life and soul, of modern sciences.

Ilm Al-kalam and interpretation of religion

ILM al-KALAM, one of the ‘religious sciences’ of Islam. The term is usually translated, as an approximate rendering, ‘theology’.

The doctors of kalam (mutakallimun) were to take a view: this is one of many well-known definitions: ‘kalam is the science which is concerned with firmly establishing religious beliefs by adducing proofs and with banishing doubts’ (from the Mawaqif of al-_dhi, 8th/14th cent.).

‘Ilm al-kalam is the discipline which brings to the service of religious beliefs (‘aqa’id) discursive arguments; which thus provides a place for reflexion and meditation, and hence for reason, in the elucidation and defence of the content of the faith. It takes its stand firstly against ‘doubters and deniers’, and its function as defensive ‘apologia’ cannot be over-stressed. A fairly common synonymous term is ‘ilm al-tawhid, the ‘science of the Unity (of God)’, understood as concerned not merely with the divine unity but with all the bases of the Muslim faith, especially prophecy (e.g., al-Dhurdhani, Sharh al-Mawaqif, ed. Cairo 13t5, i, t6).

Another interpretation sometimes suggested explains ‘ilm al-kalam as ‘science of the Word of God’. The attribute of the Word and the nature of the qur’an were indeed among the first themes treated, and discussions on this subject continued throughout the centuries. But this was by no means the first question undertaken (see below, a II) nor that later treated at most length. It seems much more likely that kalam referred at first to discursive arguments, and the mutakallimun (‘loquentes’) were ‘reasoners’. This was the case as early as the time of Ma’bad al-Dhuhani (d. 80/699-700). Kalam became a regular discipline when these arguments and discussions dealt with the content of the faith. It is this character of discursive and reasoned apologia which was to attract the attacks both of the traditionists and of the falasifa.

Are religious interpretations religion itself

Interpretations of religion or “religious hermeneutics” is another branch of religious research. The followers of this school believe in the validity and effectiveness of all the presuppositions of every interpreter of religion when he attempts to understand a sacred text. In the various modern interpretations of religion there are numerous perspectives, the most important of which are held by Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Religious interpretations we mean that form of interpretations which is concerned with any of the problems of a religious nature within a particular religion.         Needless to say religious interpretations, like other forms of interpretations, must have reliable sources from which the raw material of its interpretations originates and upon which it depends.

The single source upon which the divinely revealed religion of Islam depends and upon which it is based, in as much as it is based on a revelation of celestial origin, is none other than the Holy Qur’an. It is the Qur’an which is the definitive testament of the universal and ever-living prophet hood of the Prophet and it is the content of the Qur’an that bears the substance of the Islamic call. Of course the fact that the Qur’an is alone the source of Islamic religious thought does not eliminate other sources and origins of correct thinking.

It has become clear from what has been said thus far that the Holy Qur’an, which is the principal source of religious thought in Islam has given full authority to the external meanings of its words for those who give ear to its message. The same external meaning of the Qur’anic verses has made the sayings of the Prophet complementary to the words of the Qur’an and has declared them to be authoritative like the Qur’an.

Introduction

Knowledge can be acquired through reflection, unveiling, or scripture. The human subtle reality (al Latifat al-Insan-iyya), also called the “ soul “ (nafs), knows in a variety of modes are reason (‘aql) and heart (qalb). Aql, as shown by its root meaning, is that which limits the free and ties down the unconstricted.  Qalb means fluctuation, for the heart undergoes constant change and transmutation in keeping with the newer repeating self disclosures of God.

The Rational Faculty

Reason or the rational faculty is the fundamental power of the human soul. Spiritual being may also posses the faculty known as ‘aql, but then it might be more accurate to say that the spiritual being is itself a ‘aql. In such contexts, the word can be translated better as “intellect “is the luminous pole of creation., sometimes identified with Breath of Allah Merciful.

By its nature reason perceives (idrak),whether through an inherent, intuitive knowledge that needs nothing from outside, or through various instrumens, such as the five senses and reflective consideration (nazar fikri). Reflection (fikr) is the power of though or cogitation, the ability of the soul to put together the data gathered by sense perception or acquired from imagination in order to reach rational conclusions

Reason, reflection and consideration can be treated as distinct realities, each with a positive role to play. But when misused, they share certain common denominator  which allow Ibn al Arabi to lump their possessors into a single category. Reason has a second, closely related meaning which plays an important role in Islamic moral and spiritual teachings.

Shahwa is a synonym or near synonym of the term hawa, “ caprice “, which is the tendency in man which turn him away from divine guidance. Just as passion is made negative by the existence of reason, so also caprice becomes a negative force only because of existence of the Law. Inasmuch as reason rules over passion and caprice, it leads man on the path of his felicity, which is the path of the Law. In this respect it plays a positive role. According to Ibn al Arabi, all created things know God through an inborn knowledge, with the exception of man and the jinn. They alone were given reflection in order to gain knowledge of God

Reflection

Reflection, as we have seen, is one of the six instruments by which the rational faculty gains knowledge, the other five being the senses. Reflection is a faculty found only in human being.  Like others tools, reflection can be used for good and evil ends. But human being possess no higher tool, since all other tools are controlled through it.

The fundamental function of reflection is to lead man to the understanding that he cannot reach knowledge of God through his own resources. Through reflection, man sees that reason delimits and define everything that it knows, while the Divine Essence is beyond delimitation and definition. Hence the only knowledge about God which reflection can hand over to reason is the knowledge of what God is not.

Through reflection reason can grasp God’s incomparability. But to gain any positive and affirmative knowledge of God, any statement about what God is rather than what He is not, it must have recourse to revelation.

Ibn al Arabi makes clear in many passages, including the continuation of the above, that this knowledge of God’s incomparability can be attained by reflection without revelation. But there is a good deal of knowledge about God and the next world that can only come through a revealed Law, and again, there is no way to actualized the felicity of the next world without following the Law. The Folk of Allah understand what God meant when He commanded human beings to seek knowledge. Hence they abandon reflection and return directly to God

Consideration

Consideration means to look, to gaze, to inspect, to investigate. Consideration (nazar) is a mental activity commanded by Kuran, and in this sense Ibn al Arabi sees it as totally positive. But holds that the learned classes have forgotten the original goal of consideration, just as they have forgotten the proper use of reflection.

Consideration has an important role to play, but it must be limited to that role. Those who depend upon consideration are misled when they deal with things which should be left for example, to faith. The possessor of consideration (sahib al nazar) is not wrong to consider. He is wrong to depend upon consideration in all domains.

The greatest error of the possessor of consideration is to inter or at the revealed Law and to explain away Those parts of it which do not accord with their own understanding of God and the cosmos. The only way to escape the errors to which reason, consideration, and reflection are prone is to adhere firmly to the Scale of the Law, which puts each thing back in its proper place.  In this way the seeker opens himself up to the possibility of gaining knowledge and certainty directly from God, as man was meant to do. This is way of unveiling, or the witnessing of God’s self-disclosure in all thing

Following Authority

Following authority (taqlid) is major topic of discussion in such school of Islamic though as principles of jurisprudence (ushul al fiqh). The word is derived from the same root as qilada “necklace“ or ”collar“. One person follow the authority of another by taking his words and deeds as a collar around his own neck. Following authority is often contrasted with ijtihad, individual striving to draw conclusions concerning the rulings of the Law, or Mastery of the Law. It may also be contrasted with tahqiq, “verification“ which for Ibn al Arabi delineates the station of great Gnostics, those who have verified the truth of their knowledge through unveiling and direct vision.

No one can have knowledge unless he knows thing through his own essence. The knowledge of thing and not things possessed by everything other than the One is following of authority. Since it has been established that other than God cannot have knowledge of a thing without following authority.

In any case, there is no escape from following authority. But once you know God through God and all thing through God, then you will not be visited  in that by ignorance, obfuscation, doubts, or uncertainties.

The rational thinker from among the people of consideration imagine that they know what consideration, sense perception, and reason have bestowed upon them, but they are following the authority of these things. Every faculty is prone to a certain kind of mistake. Nothing can eliminate this incurable disease, unless all a person’s knowledge is known through God. God knows through His own essence, not through anything added to it. Anyone who follow the authority of no one. Anyone who follows the authority of other than God follows authority of him who is visited by mistakes and who is correct only chance.  So follow the authority of your Lord, since there is no escape from following authority! Don’t follow your rational faculty in its interpretation.

When God opens the gate to the possessor of this heart, he actualizes a divine self disclosure which gives to him that which accords with its own properties. He takes them through an unveiling which corresponds with and confirms for him what the revealed scripture and messengers have mentioned. He used to ascribe those things to God through faith and as a mere narrator, without verifying their meanings or adding to them.

Unveiling

In many passages Ibn Al Arabi explains the difference between two basic kinds of knowledge : That which can be acquired by the rational faculty, and the “gnosis” which can only come trough spiritual practice and divine self-disclosure. The way of gaining knowledge is divided between reflection (fikr) and bestowed (wahb), which is the way of our companions.

The first way is the way of unveiling. It is an incontrovertible knowledge which, is actualized through unveiling and which man finds in himself. The second way is the way of reflection and reasoning (istidlal) through rational demonstration (burhan aqli). This way is lower than the first way.

At the beginning of introduction to the Futuhat, Ibn al’Arabi explains that the various kinds of knowledge can be ranked according to excellence : The science are of three levels :

First Level is the science  of reason, which is every knowledge which is actualized for you by fact that it is self evident or after considering proof, on condition that purport of that proof is discovered.

Second Level is the science of states (ahwal), which cannot be reached except trough testing.

Third Level is the science of mysteries (asrar). It is the knowledge which beyond the stage of reason. It is knowledge through the blowing (nafth) of the Holy Spirit (ruh al qudus) into the heart (ru’).

In the third level is divided in the two sort: the first sort can be perceived by reason. The second  sort is divided is the science of reports (akhbar), and concerning them one can say that they are true or false, unless the truthfulness of the report-giver and his inerrancy in what he says have been established for the one who receives the report.

True knowledge is unveiled by God, without the intermediary of reflection or any faculty. Sound knowledge is not given by reflection, nr by what the rational thinker establish by means of their reflective power. Sound  knowledge is only that which God throws into the heart of the knower.